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Prior work on the performance consequences of corporate diversification has treated
all powerful owners as seeking the same benefits from diversification (i.e, higher profit
rather than growth) and therefore limiting value appropriation by other stakeholders
such as employees and managers. In contrast, we distinguish between domestic “re-
lational” owners and foreign “transactional” owners in Japanese corporations. Al-
though transactional owners do indeed prioritize profitability when diversifying,
relational owners primarily seek growth rather than profits from diversification.
Furthermore, relational owners also allow managers and employees to appropriate
more of the rents arising from diversification than do transactional owners.
A central question in corporate strategy research
concerns the nature of the relationship between
performance and diversification (for reviews, see
Hitt, Tihanyi, Miller, and Connelly [2006]; Hoskis-
son and Hitt [1990]; Palich, Cardinal, and Miller
[2000]; and Ramanujam and Varadarajan [1989]).
Both product and geographic diversification can
facilitate the leveraging of a firm’s competencies
and enable it to exploit opportunities in multiple
markets. However, the bureaucratic and agency
costs associated with diversification can impair
firm performance (Collis & Montgomery, 1997; Lu
& Beamish, 2004). An implicit assumption in the
extensive research on the relationship between di-
versification and firm performance is that all firms
should diversify with the same objective: to maxi-
mize the profit (returns) to shareholders. Yet this
assumption stands in opposition to much existing
work in strategy that emphasizes the importance of
stakeholders (Freeman, 1984) as well as differences
among shareholders (David, Kochhar, & Levitas,
1998; Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson, & Grossman, 2002;
Kochhar & David, 1995).
The rent appropriation perspective (Coff, 1999)
provides a useful lens for understanding how a
firm’s stakeholders can influence both the type and
distribution of the firm’s returns from the imple-
mentation of a particular corporate strategy. Most
other stakeholders are priority claimants relative to
shareholders. They have contracts with the firm,
albeit sometimes implicit, that guarantee them pay-
ments equal to or greater than their “opportunity
costs,” and they can resort to court adjudication if
those contracts are violated. Shareholders, as resid-
ual claimants, forego the benefit of contractually
guaranteed returns and face greater risk. Managers
should therefore run a firm, within the confines of
the law, so as to maximize the riskier returns of
shareholders, while limiting stakeholder claims to
opportunity costs (Friedman, 1970). However,
some stakeholders may be able to appropriate the
“economic rents” that accrue from diversification
by obtaining payments in excess of their opportu-
nity costs. Hence, a firm’s diversification strategy
may yield economic rents but may, nevertheless,
fail to yield performance returns for shareholders if
other stakeholders appropriate those economic
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rents. We propose that a more complete under-
standing of the performance implications of diver-
sification requires paying close attention to the per-
formance goals and bargaining power of various
stakeholder groups, in particular the powerful
owners that vie to appropriate economic rents.
The governance literature addresses rent appro-
priation concerns as an “agency problem” involv-
ing conflicts of interest between two major stake-
holder groups, owners and managers, over the
potentially conflicting goals of growth and profit
(Amihud & Kamin, 1979; Brush, Bromiley, & Hen-
drickx, 2000; Marris, 1964). Agency theorists con-
tend that sales growth may provide managers with
private benefits such as high pay, power, status,
and prestige. Accordingly, managers favor higher
levels of sales growth than is optimal for share-
holder profit maximization. As weak owners are
unable to sufficiently constrain managerial oppor-
tunism through governance, managers implement
diversification strategies that generate higher
growth that benefits managers but yields lower
profits for shareholders (Kim, Hoskisson, & Wan,
2004).
Although existing research on the relationships
between ownership, diversification, growth, and
profits is insightful, it is also incomplete in at least
one important respect. Owners differ not just in
their power but also in their performance goals
(Hoskisson et al., 2002). Although much of the re-
search on ownership heterogeneity concerns U.S.
corporations (David et al., 1998; Hoskisson et al.,
2002; Kochhar & David, 1995), Japan presents an
interesting contrast among owners. The 1990s
marked a significant shift in the ownership struc-
ture of Japanese corporations that Ahmadjian and
Robbins (2005) termed a “clash of capitalisms.” In
this clash, two important groups came into conflict:
the traditional “relational” owners (typically do-
mestic corporations and financial institutions that
rarely sell their shares and have close relational ties
with firms) and a new set of “transactional” owners
(mostly foreign institutional investors from the
United States and the United Kingdom with only
arms’-length relationships with the Japanese firms
in which they hold shares). As transactional own-
ers lack the multiple business relationships with a
firm that typify relational owners, they can only
appropriate rents from the firm in the form of fi-
nancial profits (i.e., dividends and share price ap-
preciation). Relational owners, however, appropri-
ate rents both from financial profits and from firm
growth. Growth yields additional return to rela-
tional owners because of their multiple business
relationships. Thus, dissenting from the assump-
tion in prior work that all powerful owners appro-
priate rents solely through higher profits, we pro-
pose that some powerful owners may appropriate
rents through growth and may influence a firm’s
managers accordingly.
We further extend prior work by considering
how the power and identity of a firm’s owners
affect the returns of other stakeholders. In addition
to benefiting the firm’s owners, diversification may
also benefit other stakeholders—for example, by
enhancing the career advancement opportunities
and job security of employees (Wang & Barney,
2006) and executives (Rose & Shepard, 1997). Al-
though stakeholder considerations have universal
importance (Wang & Barney, 2006), they are espe-
cially salient in Japan, where companies have an
institutionalized commitment to stakeholders other
than shareholders (Aoki, 1988; Kester, 1991). Coff
(1999) argued that shareholders can appropriate
more economic rents when they have bargaining
power to restrict the flow of rents to other stake-
holders. A simple application of rent appropriation
might suggest that all powerful owners will seek to
appropriate rents for themselves by limiting those
appropriated by other stakeholders. To the con-
trary, we propose that the performance goals of
powerful owners shape the extent of value appro-
priation by other stakeholder groups. Prior work
has noted that relational owners, unlike transac-
tional owners, are supportive of implicit contracts
with stakeholder groups such as lifetime employ-
ees (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005; Ahmadjian &
Robinson, 2001; Yoshikawa, Phan, & David, 2005)
and core suppliers (Kester, 1991), thus facilitating
greater value capture by these stakeholders.
Diversification can thus serve as a means to mul-
tiple ends. These ends can be either consistent or
conflicting. In this study, we develop theory to
explain why different types of owners may accrue
different types of benefits from diversification, and
hence may encourage managers to pursue diversi-
fication for divergent reasons. Furthermore, these
divergent performance goals can have weighty con-
sequences for a firm’s other stakeholders.
Our empirical results indicate that relational
owners emphasize growth, but transactional own-
ers emphasize profit. The relationship between cor-
porate diversification and profit is stronger with
transactional than with relational ownership. Con-
versely, the relationship between corporate diver-
sification and growth is stronger with relational
than with transactional ownership. Furthermore,
we find that relational ownership facilitates greater
value capture by stakeholders from diversification
than does transactional ownership. Our results in-
dicate that diversification provides greater benefits
for other stakeholders in a firm, such as its employ-
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ees and executives, when relational ownership is
high than when transactional ownership is high.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
Ownership Structure and Identity: Relational
and Transactional Owners in Japan
Domestic financial institutions such as banks
and insurance companies and domestic nonfinan-
cial corporations have traditionally held a large
proportion of the shares of Japanese corporations
(see Sheard [1994] for a review). Financial institu-
tions provide loans and other financial services to
the firms, such as brokerage, and nonfinancial cor-
porations are typically the suppliers or customers
of the firms. Even in the absence of direct business
relationships, norms of reciprocity bind owners to
provide mutual support when firms experience fi-
nancial difficulties. Traditionally, shares have been
held reciprocally and, although publicly tradable,
have rarely been sold.
The economic downturn of the 1990s marked a
dramatic shift in the ownership structure of Japa-
nese corporations. The economic downturn made it
difficult for financially troubled long-term owners
to maintain their historic levels of ownership in
affiliated firms (Dvorak, Guth, Singer, & Zaun,
2001). Foreign investors often stepped in to pur-
chase these shares (Yoshikawa & Gedajlovic, 2002),
resulting in a net shift of ownership toward foreign
investors. Foreign owners gained increasing prom-
inence and power as their average stakes increased
from 4.2 percent in 1990 to 13.2 percent in 2000,
while domestic ownership by financial institutions
and nonfinancial corporations dropped from 70.4
to 59.3 percent (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005).
These foreign owners were predominantly portfo-
lio investors from the United States and the United
Kingdom, which accounted for 32 and 39 percent,
respectively, of all foreign shareholdings in Japan
in 1997 (Bank of Japan, 2004).
In Japan, foreign owners differ from domestic
owners in several critical ways. First, domestic
owners typically have large block holdings, but
foreign shareholdings are typically dispersed
among a very large number of investors. Second,
major domestic owners are often suppliers of goods
and services to the firms they own shares in, but
foreign owners usually do not have any business
relationships with the firms in which they have
ownership positions. Third, domestic owners tend
to hold their shares for the long term, but foreign
owners tend to trade their shares frequently. Thus,
if a firm encounters problems, foreign owners are
able to sell their shares and disassociate themselves
from the firm. Domestic owners, rather than selling
their shares, tend to provide mutual support to help
firms weather their financial difficulties (Sheard,
1994). Accordingly, we label domestic owners “re-
lational” because they are long-term owners with
complex performance goals. Domestic owners do
not just seek financial gains from their sharehold-
ings in firms—they also have other business and
reciprocal relationships with those firms that yield
benefits (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Porter, 1992;
Rousseau, 1995). Furthermore, we describe foreign
owners as “transactional” (Rousseau, 1995) be-
cause they obtain returns solely from their share-
holdings and lack other relationships with the
firms in which they have ownership positions.
Although both transactional and relational own-
ers can influence a firm’s managers, they differ in
the nature and source of the influence exercised.
Relational owners often obtain representation on a
firm’s board of directors (Kaplan &Minton, 1994) to
gain a subjective understanding of strategic issues.
Most large Japanese firms borrow from multiple
banks but maintain a closer relationship with a
“main bank,” typically the largest lender and
owner, which takes a lead role in monitoring the
firms on behalf of other relational owners (Aoki &
Patrick, 1994). When firms face financial difficul-
ties, relational owners, led by “main banks,” act in
concert to help firms work through their problems
by providing capital and exchanging goods and
services on advantageous terms (Hoshi & Kashyap,
2001). Empirical evidence has affirmed the profit
redistribution contention, wherein relational own-
ers “tax” profitable firms to benefit poorly perform-
ing firms that need financial assistance (Gedajlovic
& Shapiro, 2002; Lincoln, Gerlach, & Ahmadjian,
1996). Board membership and delegated monitor-
ing by a main bank grants relational owners con-
siderable influence in this profit redistribution pro-
cess. Thus, although relational owners depend on a
firm for business (Kochhar & David, 1995), this
dependency is mutual, and through the governance
safeguards described above, relational owners gain
considerable influence.
Although transactional owners lack direct influ-
ence derived from board representation, the threat
of selling shares provides them with considerable
influence. As Ahmadjian and Robbins noted, “For-
eigners were known for pulling out of a stock very
quickly when they were unhappy” (2005: 457). For-
eign owners traded extensively, accounting for
nearly 30 percent of all stock transactions in 1996,
although they held just 10 percent of aggregate
stock ownership (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005).
Further, foreign owners often exhibit herd behavior
(Kamesaka, Nofsinger, & Kawakita, 2002) that cre-
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ates a snowball effect that can significantly impair
stock prices. Sell-offs can signal that a firm is
poorly managed, thus increasing the threat of de-
fault and raising the cost of capital (Bhojraj & Sen-
gupta, 2003; Brennan & Tamarowski, 2000). As fi-
nancially distressed relational owners sometimes
need to cash out their investments, Japanese man-
agers have been pressured to attract and retain for-
eign owners to avoid the negative consequences of
sell-offs. Japanese managers have therefore been
responsive to the expectations of foreign owners
about reducing costs and maximizing profits.
Prior research has shown that foreign ownership
fosters value-enhancing strategic investments
(David, Yoshikawa, Chari, & Rasheed, 2006) and
employee layoffs and divestitures (Ahmadjian &
Robbins, 2005; Ahmadjian & Robinson, 2001),
particularly in poorly performing firms (Yo-
shikawa et al., 2005).
Although they differ in how they exercise influ-
ence, both transactional and relational owners have
the power to shape firm strategy. Below, we explain
how the differences in the performance goals of
transactional and relational owners can influence a
firm’s diversification strategy and the performance
outcomes that accrue from that strategy.
Corporate Strategy, Profit, and Growth: A Rent
Appropriation Perspective
Corporate strategy involves the pursuit of eco-
nomic rents by leveraging competencies to sell
goods and services in multiple markets (Collis &
Montgomery, 1997). The performance conse-
quences of diversification into multiple product
and geographic markets has been a central question
in strategy research (for reviews, see Hitt et al.
[2006]; Hoskisson and Hitt [1990]; Palich et al.
[2000]; and Ramanujam and Varadarajan [1989]).
Although diversification can yield numerous ben-
efits to a firm, such as scale and scope economies,
increased bureaucratic and agency costs can impair
performance (Lu & Beamish, 2004). Extensive em-
pirical research has reported mixed results on the
actual performance implications of diversification
(Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990). It is important to note that
when assessing performance, this research has em-
phasized the profits that flow to shareholders, as
measured by accounting-based returns or stock
market performance. However, the achievement of
competitive advantage in a corporate strategy such
as diversification does not necessarily yield higher
performance returns for a firm’s shareholders, be-
cause the rents created are often captured by the
various stakeholders of the firm who contributed to
value creation (Coff, 1999). The governance litera-
ture has addressed rent appropriation concerns as
conflicts of interest between two major stakeholder
groups, owners and managers, over the goals of
profit versus growth (Amihud & Kamin, 1979;
Brush et al., 2000; Marris, 1964).1
Considerable work has treated growth and profit
as alternate measures of the performance benefits ac-
cruing to shareholders from diversification (Geringer,
Tallman, & Olsen, 2000; Rumelt, 1974; Varadarajan,
1986). The neoclassical theory of the firm, however,
shows that profit maximization is the desirable objec-
tive for shareholders and that growth is not always
consistent with profit maximization (Baumol, 1959).
Profit maximization requires firms to grow their sales
to the optimal level, defined as the point at which
marginal revenues from an added unit of sales equal
the marginal costs. Although sales growth enhances
profits when sales are below the optimal level, incre-
mental sales growth erodes profits when sales are
above the optimal level.
Even though growth above the optimal level can
reduce shareholder profit, firms may often still pur-
sue growth because it benefits a specific group of
stakeholders. Sales growth can provide managers
with private benefits such as higher pay, power, and
prestige. Therefore, managers often favor higher lev-
els of sales growth than is optimal for profit-oriented
shareholders (Amihud & Kamin, 1979; Brush et al.,
2000; Marris, 1964). Maximizing growth while ignor-
ing profits could ultimately lead to financial distress,
culminating in bankruptcy and concomitant adverse
consequences for managers. Hence, Baumol (1959)
explained that managers maximize growth subject to
maintaining an acceptable level of profits in order to
preserve the private benefits from high growth while
avoiding the deleterious consequences from exces-
sive growth. Thus, agency theorists have concluded
that managers emphasize growth over profit (Amihud
& Kamin, 1979; Marris, 1964), but owners prefer
profit over growth.
The power of a firm’s owners helps determine
whether profit or growth will manifest as a firm’s
strategic intent. Managers shape corporate strategy,
subject to the governance oversight provided by
owners. Thus, the performance consequences of
diversification should reflect the balance of power
1 We follow prior research and label the rent appropri-
ated by shareholders as profit. Neoclassical economic
logic treats stakeholders as fixed factors of production
and therefore leads to the conclusion that the residual
profit remaining after paying various stakeholders is
equivalent to economic profit. As noted, in the rent ap-
propriation view, both shareholders and stakeholders
can appropriate economic profit. Thus, shareholder
profit is a subset of total economic profit.
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between owners and managers (Marris, 1964). Prior
research has shown that owner-controlled firms
emphasize profits, and manager-controlled firms
emphasize growth (Amihud & Kamin, 1979). Fur-
thermore, in a study of Japanese business groups,
Kim et al. (2004) reported that diversified firms
emphasized growth over profits when governance
oversight was weak but emphasized profits over
growth when governance oversight was strong.
Although insightful, prior research is incomplete
in that its implicit assumption is that all powerful
owners will favor diversification as a means to in-
crease profits rather than as a vehicle to generate
sales growth. This view stands at odds with recent
work that has shown that different groups of owners
may have divergent performance goals (Hoskisson et
al., 2002; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). Thus, although
both relational and transactional owners can use their
influence over managers to affect a firm’s strategy—
such as its level of diversification—the outcomes they
are seeking from diversification may differ. Below,
we explain how these differences can influence the
types of performance consequences obtained from a
diversification strategy.
Diversification and Performance Implications for
Relational and Transactional Owners
Relational owners are also stakeholders, embed-
ded in a network of relationships with the firms in
which they hold ownership positions. Relational
owners obtain returns both from the financial per-
formance of the firms and from their multiple busi-
ness relationships with them. Relational owners
are therefore not solely concerned with the returns
arising from the stock price appreciation and divi-
dends that accrue from residual profits. Although
as owners they cannot be indifferent to profit, their
business relationships temper the importance of
dividend payments and stock price appreciation.
With reciprocal shareholdings, relational owners
are unlikely to press firms for higher dividends
because they must, in turn, pay out a commensu-
rate amount of dividends to their own relational
owners. They are also less concerned with variations
in share price because shares are held as stable, long-
term holdings that are rarely sold, except in the event
of serious financial distress. Furthermore, at least un-
til the late 1990s, Japanese corporations reported
share values at purchase prices in accordance with
accounting regulations, thus reducing any negative
consequences to relational owners from write-downs
to asset values (Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005).
Although growth beyond the profit-maximizing
level impairs profits, such growth can benefit rela-
tional owners in two ways. First, the opportunities
for ancillary business relationships are enhanced as a
firm’s sales grow. Banks can underwrite more busi-
ness loans and services, and suppliers of other goods
and services can obtain more contracts as the firm
diversifies and grows its sales. Second, the larger the
firm, the lower the risk to survival from a hostile
takeover or bankruptcy (Bercovitz & Mitchell, 2007).
As Kester noted, considering the complex blend
of claims on the firms in which they invest, rela-
tional owners “may well accept subnormal rates of
return on one component of its blend such as eq-
uity, provided it is able to compensate with su-
pranormal returns on another part, such as the trad-
ing relationship” (1991: 59). Capturing value
through business relationships rather than through
dividends has the added advantage of reducing the
amount of tax captured by government. Transac-
tional owners, in contrast, lack business or other
relationships with the firms in which they have
ownership positions. Therefore, they obtain no
benefits from sales growth per se and only benefit
from the returns arising from arms’-length share-
holdings: namely, the stock price appreciation and
dividends that arise from residual profits. Hence,
the relationship between diversification and firm
performance should reflect the propensity for dif-
ferent types of owners to attempt to accrue rents
from diversification in different ways. As transac-
tional owners appropriate value solely from finan-
cial profits, they discourage excessive growth and
induce managers to pursue diversification only
when it enhances profits. In contrast, the multiple
business relationships of relational owners allow
them to appropriate rents from firm growth, and
hence they will be much more tolerant of diversi-
fication that enhances growth beyond the profit-
maximizing level. Thus, the extent to which diver-
sification yields growth or profit will depend upon
a firm’s ownership structure, with relational own-
ers emphasizing growth and transactional owners
emphasizing profits.
Hypothesis 1. The relationship between diver-
sification and profit is more positive with
transactional ownership than with relational
ownership.
Hypothesis 2. The relationship between diver-
sification and growth is more positive with re-
lational ownership than with transactional
ownership.
Diversification and Performance Implications for
Employee Stakeholders
The value created from diversification does not
just flow to a firm’s relational and transactional
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owners, as other stakeholders, such as the employ-
ees and executives of the firm, can also appropriate
it (Amihud & Lev, 1981; Wang & Barney, 2006).
Diversification into new markets can lower the risk
of job loss for employees because the returns from
multiple markets are imperfectly correlated (Wang
& Barney, 2006), which makes diversified firms less
susceptible to bankruptcy or hostile takeover (Ami-
hud & Lev, 1981). Furthermore, diversification pro-
vides career advancement prospects for existing
employees by often necessitating growth in em-
ployment (Simon, 1947), and it may even spur
higher employee salaries (Marris, 1964; Peoples,
1989; Schoar, 2002). As for the executives, diversi-
fication is associated with higher compensation
(Rose & Shepard, 1997; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998)
and diminished employment risk, as indicated by
the lower performance sensitivity of pay (Ander-
son, Bates, Bizjak, & Lemmon, 2000) and reduced
turnover in more highly diversified firms (Berry,
Bizjak, Lemmon, & Naveen, 2006). Executives may
also enjoy the high levels of power and prestige that
are associated with managing a large firm (Jensen,
1986). However, these benefits may constitute a
form of employee rent appropriation that reduces
the rents available for owners. Prior research shows
that powerful owners can limit the extent of
stakeholder rent appropriation by curtailing ex-
ecutive (David et al., 1998; Hambrick & Finkel-
stein, 1995) and employee (Cronqvist, Heyman,
Nilsson, Svaleryd, & Vlachos, 2009) compensation
and by increasing the likelihood that managers will
be fired for poor performance (Allen, 1981; McEach-
ern, 1975). Although this research implies that all
powerful owners limit the rents available to other
stakeholders, we contend that owners differ in shap-
ing the appropriation of the rents that accrue from
diversification. We discuss two reasons why transac-
tional ownership inhibits employee rent capture to a
greater extent than does relational ownership.
First, the divergent performance goals of rela-
tional and transactional owners make relational
owners more amenable to rent appropriation by
stakeholders. As transactional owners prioritize
profits, rent appropriation by employee stakehold-
ers will reduce transactional owners’ profits by a
corresponding amount, and hence it poses a zero-
sum outcome. As relational owners emphasize
growth rather than profit, rent appropriation does
not necessarily pose a zero-sum outcome because
growth can provide increasing levels of benefits to
both employee stakeholders and relational owners.
Growth allows relational owners to appropriate
value from enhanced business prospects while also
allowing employee stakeholders to appropriate
value in the form of higher salaries, enhanced ca-
reer progress opportunities resulting form employ-
ment growth, and attenuated employment risk.
Thus, though transactional owners are likely to use
their power to limit employee rent appropriation,
relational owners are less likely to do so.
Second, not only are the interests of employee
stakeholders and relational owners generally better
aligned than are the interests of employee stake-
holders and transactional owners, but also, rela-
tional owners have incentives to exhibit forbear-
ance with respect to the rent appropriation
activities of stakeholders, especially in comparison
to transactional owners. To preserve long-term
business relationships, relational owners are more
likely to desist from appropriating the quasi-rents
of stakeholders such as employees, executives, and
suppliers (Lincoln et al., 1996). Although such ac-
tions can hurt their own performance over the short
term (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 2002), these losses can
be recouped from gains obtained through the secu-
rity of future business relationships. Furthermore,
the norm of reciprocity, whereby relational owners
mutually safeguard each other from possible hos-
tile takeovers and bankruptcy, directs firms to pre-
serve their commitments to stakeholders because
these firms in turn will provide assistance if rela-
tional owners find themselves in difficulties
(Sheard, 1994). Transactional owners, by contrast,
neither have business relationships nor any mutual
safeguards, and thus they have incentive to limit
the benefits accrued by stakeholders to maximize
their own profit. Essentially, relational owners
have economic incentives that can be met by a firm
strategy that is convergent with the interests of
employee stakeholders.
We contend that both managerial salaries and the
size of a firm’s workforce should reflect the greater
tendency for transactional owners to limit rent ap-
propriation by employee stakeholders. A long-
standing argument in prior research in agency the-
ory is that growth, which diversification generally
produces, may allow managers to capture value
through higher salaries (Jensen, 1986; Marris,
1964). Furthermore, as diversification generally in-
creases the complexity of managerial tasks, it may
provide managers an opportunity to justify higher
salaries (Henderson & Fredrickson, 1996; Rose &
Shepard, 1997). Existing research has already
shown that managers can generally obtain more
lucrative compensation packages from owners with
business relationships (David et al., 1998). Al-
though increases in diversification may sometimes
warrant greater pay, relational owners will likely be
much more generous than transactional owners be-
cause they not only favor growth over profits, but
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may also anticipate reciprocal favors from the re-
warded managers.
In terms of the size of a workforce, we have
argued that both rank-and-file employees and exec-
utives may benefit from growth in the workforce.
(Ahmadjian & Robbins, 2005; Ahmadjian & Robin-
son, 2001) have shown that foreign transactional
ownership is associated with a greater prevalence
of layoffs in Japanese firms, and relational domestic
owners, who viewed lifetime employment as legit-
imate and appropriate, helped curtail this effect.
Conversely, relational owners should also be gen-
erally more supportive than transactional owners
of employment growth, and diversification may
help serve as a prime vehicle for driving such
growth. As Kester (1991: 15) noted, growth oppor-
tunities in their core businesses were sparse for
Japanese corporations in the 1990s, and hence di-
versification into new markets served as a prime
vehicle for fueling employment growth and “fulfill-
ing the expectations of some key stakeholders (la-
bor in particular)” (1991: 15). Similarly, relational
owners may support diversification as a vehicle for
avoiding layoffs by finding new roles for redundant
employees. Thus, although transactional owners
will only favor diversification that is undertaken to
increase profits, growth-oriented relational owners,
bolstered by norms of reciprocity, will be more
inclined to support diversification that is under-
taken as a means of firm growth that can support
both higher managerial compensation and a greater
number of employees.
Hypothesis 3. The relationship between diver-
sification and growth in employment is more
positive with relational ownership than with
transactional ownership.
Hypothesis 4. The relationship between diver-
sification and managerial compensation is
more positive with relational ownership than
with transactional ownership.
METHODS
Sample
We utilized a sample of Japanese firms, as this
population provided the requisite variance in
owner type—relational versus transactional—that
we required to test our hypotheses (Ahmadjian &
Robbins, 2005). Further, Japanese firms have en-
gaged actively in international and product diver-
sification activities since the late 1980s, providing
a population with considerable variance on the di-
versification dimension (Lu & Beamish, 2004).
To construct our sample, we combined data from
four sources. Most of our data for variables came
from the Pacific-Basin Capital Markets (PACAP)
database for Japan. We supplemented these data
with information from the annual publication Jap-
anese Overseas Investments, which was used to
calculate our measure of international diversifica-
tion. We used the Japan Company Handbook to
calculate our measure of product diversification
and the NEEDS database to construct our measures
of employment growth and director salaries.
Our initial sample encompassed all 16,400 firm-
year observations listed in both PACAP and Japa-
nese Overseas Investments for 1990 through 2004.
As small firms may be effectively locked out of
foreign securities markets, we deleted the 576 firm-
year observations for firms that had a book value of
equity less than 3 billion yen (Anderson & Makhija,
1999). We also excluded firms in the highly regu-
lated financial, public utilities, and communica-
tions sectors (225 firm-year observations). Further-
more, we also lagged the independent variables one
year so that growth and performance over a given
year were modeled as a function of the ownership
structure at the end of the previous year. We be-
lieve this constitutes the most appropriate lag
structure, as more distant predictors should be less
influential, and contemporaneous measures tend to
produce more endogeneity problems. As our theory
was developed for foreign portfolio owners, we ex-
cluded the 31 firms in which foreign owners had
substantial (large block) ownership interests that
could be regarded as “relational.” This exclusion
resulted in a sample of 14,294 observations, encom-
passing 1,180 unique firms. However, the actual
number of observations varied from model to
model because the market information necessary
for constructing our measure of profitability was
sometimes missing; product diversification data
were only available for the years 1992–2001, and
we could not find unambiguous matches in NEEDS
for some of the firms listed in PACAP.
Dependent Variables
We modeled two performance outcomes: growth
and profit. The appropriate measure of firm growth
depends upon the theoretical rationale for a study
(Weinzimmer, Nystrom, & Freeman, 1998). Our the-
ory suggests that relational owners may benefit as a
focal firm’s revenues increase. Hence, we assessed
firm growth with the natural logarithm of year-over-
year change in sales, specified as ln(salest/salest – 1)
(Brush et al., 2000). Similarly, using data drawn from
NEEDS, we measured employment growth as the nat-
ural log of year-over-year change in number of total
employees: ln(employeest/employeest – 1).
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To measure shareholder profit, we use Tobin’s Q,
which is the ratio of a firm’s market value to the
replacement cost of its assets (Morck, Shleifer, &
Vishny, 1988). The market value of a firm was
computed as the sum of the book value of its debt
and the market value of its equity, and the replace-
ment cost of assets was computed as the book value
of total assets. The market value of a firm represents
the stock market’s capitalization of the expected
present value of future cash flows discounted by an
appropriate risk rate (Lindenberg & Ross, 1981).
Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988) noted two ad-
vantages of Tobin’s Q as a measure of shareholder
profit. First, it is less susceptible to accounting-
based distortions because it relies on stock market
values, unlike accounting-biased measures such as
return on assets (ROA). Second, it is forward look-
ing in incorporating not just current profitability,
but also future profitability as gauged by the stock
market valuation of future cash flows. Thus, To-
bin’s Q is a commonly used measure of firm prof-
itability from a shareholder perspective (Linden-
berg & Ross, 1981). Although we have noted some
of the limitations associated with accounting-based
measures, we found that tests using ROA yielded
results that were substantively similar to the results
we report using the market-based Tobin’s Q.
Finally, the variable salaries was a proxy for
managerial compensation using data from NEEDS
on total director compensation, which includes
base salary plus bonuses. Unlike firms in the
United States, Japanese companies are not required
to disclose the pay of individual executives and
only report the total pay of all directors, which
includes salaries, bonuses, fees, and other perks
and benefits. Japanese companies have few and
often no outside directors, and although some di-
rectors are likely affiliated to relational owners
through past employment, they tend to be full-time
employees of the firm on whose board they sit
(Gerlach, 1992). Consequently, a firm’s president
and its top executives comprise most or all of its
board of directors. Therefore, director pay, al-
though not identical to executive pay, is a reason-
able proxy that has been used as an indicator of
executive pay in a number of studies (e.g., Joh,
1999; Kaplan, 1994; Murase, 1998; Xu, 1997).
Independent Variables
Our hypotheses relate to the outcomes of diver-
sification. We expected product and international
diversification to have similar effects, as both entail
entering new markets and both can generate sales
growth and impact profitability. Moreover, both
may similarly benefit employee stakeholders. Intu-
itively, it may seem that internationalization
merely substitutes foreign factors of production for
domestic factors of production, potentially harm-
ing traditional domestic employee stakeholders.
However, prior research has provided a more com-
prehensive view of international growth and has
distinguished between the effects of substitution
(i.e., international diversification may reduce de-
mand for domestic labor as overseas labor is hired)
and the effects of enhanced output (i.e., interna-
tional diversification may raise demand for domes-
tic labor because of increased international sales)
(Chen & Ku, 2003). In practice, international di-
versification combines the substitution and the
output effects. Research on Japanese corporations
has shown that internationalization has generally
tended to raise levels of domestic employment
(Higuchi & Matsuura, 2003). Furthermore, interna-
tional diversification is also likely to benefit sup-
pliers because international expansion by a firm
frequently helps its suppliers to expand overseas as
well (Banerji & Sambharya, 1996; Martin, Swami-
nathan, & Mitchell, 1998). Thus, we believe that in
general, the effects of international diversification
should be similar to those of product diversifica-
tion. Accordingly, we tested all of our hypotheses
using both measures of product diversification and
international diversification.
Following previous studies (Delios & Beamish,
1999; Lu & Beamish, 2004), we derived two count
measures of international diversification from Jap-
anese Overseas Investments. The first measure was
a count of the total number of overseas subsidiaries
that each firm had in a given year. The second
measure was a count of the total number of coun-
tries in which a firm had overseas subsidiaries in a
given year. We then combined these two measures
and created an index of international diversifica-
tion following the method used by Lu and Beamish
(2004). Specifically, to convert the count measures
into ratios, we divided each count measure by the
maximum value for that variable. We then calcu-
lated the average of these two ratios. The final
measure, international diversification, has values
ranging from 0 to 1, with larger values representing
higher diversification. For product diversification,
we gathered 1992–2001 data on each firm’s prod-
uct-segment sales, classified using three-digit SIC
codes from the Japan Company Handbook (Delios
& Beamish, 1999) and calculated the variable as an
entropy measure (Palepu, 1985).
Transactional and relational ownership were as-
sessed as the total percentages of all outstanding
shares held by the respective types of owner. Larger
values represented more power for an owner type
and consequently more influence over the out-
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comes of strategic decisions. Specifically, transac-
tional ownership was the total number of shares
owned by foreigners divided by total shares out-
standing, and relational ownership was the total
number of shares owned by Japanese financial in-
stitutions and other Japanese business corporations
divided by total shares outstanding (Yoshikawa
et al., 2005).
We also controlled for a number of other factors
that might impact either firm growth or profit.
Fixed assets was net fixed assets divided by total
assets. Cash was measured as total cash and mar-
ketable securities divided by total assets, and size,
as the natural log of total firm sales. Free cash flow
was the ratio of operating income less taxes, inter-
est, and dividends paid divided by total assets.
Leverage was total debt (short-term loans, long-
term loans, and debentures) divided by total assets.
Volatility assessed the instability of the firm’s earn-
ings as the standard deviation of return on assets
over the previous five years. In addition to these
annual, time-varying, firm-level control variables,
we included a number of industry-level control
variables. For each industry, industry growth, in-
dustry profit, and industry volatilitywere measured
as the median value of the corresponding firm-level
variable for all firms for which that industry was
their primary industry.
Analysis
Our analysis presented two critical method-
ological considerations. First, unobserved heter-
ogeneity was a concern because our data contain
multiple observations per firm. Therefore, we in-
corporated fixed firm effects into all our models.
We deemed fixed-effects models to be superior to
random-effects models because a Hausman test in-
dicated significant (p  .01), systematic difference
in the coefficients yielded by the two types of mod-
els. A second methodological consideration was
the potential endogeneity of both ownership struc-
ture and diversification. If our models failed to
include every variable that significantly influenced
both of these variables and the dependent variable,
then the endogenous variables would be correlated
with the error term, and traditional ordinary least
squares (OLS) methods would suffer from omitted
variables bias. This problem could be reduced by
using predetermined (i.e., lagged) independent
variables, and firm fixed effects could further alle-
viate endogeneity issues by controlling for any
omitted variables that were invariant over time.
However, time-varying omitted variables might
still be a problem.
A solution to the endogeneity problem was to use
two-stage least squares (2SLS) instrumental vari-
ables regression methods. We could eliminate en-
dogeneity bias by first regressing the endogenous
variables on all the independent variables and then
using the predicted values of the endogenous vari-
ables in lieu of the observed values in the second
stage, when the dependent variable was regressed
on the predictor variables. Although this approach
improves estimates of the effect of an endogenous
variable on a dependent variable, it is also less
efficient because it tends to produce much larger
standard errors than OLS (see Wooldridge, 2003:
Ch. 15). Hence, even if a variable is theoretically
endogenous, it is preferable to not model it as en-
dogenous unless tests indicate that it induces a
statistical problem. Accordingly, we tested to see if
any of our critical variables created an endogeneity
problem.
To test for endogeneity problems, we needed to
find valid instruments for each of the potentially
endogenous variables. These instruments should
be strongly related to the endogenous variables but
weakly related to the dependent variable. Although
the suitability of various instruments varied some-
what with different dependent variables, industry-
level measures for the potentially endogenous
variables were generally valid instruments. Fur-
thermore, variables for cash and fixed assets also
sometimes served as valid instruments. We also
created instruments for the interactions between
ownership structure and diversification by inter-
acting their respective instruments. All the 2SLS
models that we tested employed more instruments
than endogenous variables to enable tests of overi-
dentifying restrictions to verify both that the instru-
mental variables were appropriately excluded from
the second-stage regression and uncorrelated with
the error term in the second-stage regression, which
is a critical assumption of 2SLS regressions. David-
son-MacKinnon tests of exogeneity indicated that
the only endogeneity problem was created by inter-
national diversification in the profit models (F 
7.7, p  .01). Hence, we employed 2SLS regres-
sions with firm fixed effects for these models and
standard fixed-effects regressions for all other mod-
els. Finally, all of our hypotheses compare the effects
of relational and transactional ownership. Thus, to
test our hypotheses we used Wald tests to determine
whether the pertinent regression coefficients were
significantly different from one another.
All four of our dependent variables contained
some extreme observations. Rather than drop out-
liers or nonlinearly transform the data, we achieved
comparable model fit by winsorizing growth,
profit, employment growth, and salaries at the 99th
and 1st percentiles of their respective distributions.
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After winsorizing, analysis of Cook’s D s suggested
that no outlier had a statistically significant impact
on the models. Finally, all models included year
fixed effects (not reported) in addition to the firm
fixed effects. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics
for all variables.
RESULTS
Table 2 reports results of our empirical analysis
of international diversification. Models 1 and 2
present the fixed-effects regressions that were used
to test the effects of ownership structure and inter-
national diversification on sales growth. Model 1
reveals that both relational ownership and transac-
tional ownership are positively related to sales
growth, and the two coefficients are not signifi-
cantly different. International diversification has
no significant main effect on sales growth. Model 2
adds the hypothesized interactions. Their addition
significantly improves model fit. Although the in-
teraction between international diversification and
transactional ownership is not significant, the in-
teraction between international diversification and
relational ownership is positive and significant. In
keeping with Hypothesis 1, the difference between
the two interactions is significant (F  6.85, p 
.01), suggesting that sales growth is the perfor-
mance objective of international diversification
when relational ownership is high, but not when
transactional ownership is high.
Models 3 and 4 present the 2SLS-IV regressions
that we used to test the effects of ownership struc-
ture and international diversification on profit. The
Sargan overidentification test statistic was insignif-
icant for both models, confirming that the instru-
mental variables were indeed exogenous and cor-
rectly excluded from the profit equation. Also, the
Wald chi-square was highly significant for both
models. We do not report multiple squared corre-
lation coefficient statistics (R2s) because this statis-
tic has no natural interpretation in 2SLS regres-
sions. Although 2SLS methods yield better
estimates of the ceteris paribus effect of an endog-
enous variable on a dependent variable, overall
model goodness of fit is not a consideration and
may very well decline when a variable is treated as
endogenous (see Wooldridge, 2003: Ch. 15). Ac-
cordingly, it is also inappropriate to test whether
including an endogenous variable (or interaction)
improves overall model fit.
Model 3 reveals that relational ownership, trans-
actional ownership, and international diversifica-
tion are all positively related to profit. Interest-
ingly, the coefficient for transactional ownership is
significantly greater than that for relational owner-
ship (2  144.23, p  .01), and the magnitude of
the difference suggests that on a share-per-share
basis, transactional owners are over three times
more effective than relational owners in pressuring
managers to improve profit. Model 4 adds in the
hypothesized interactions. Although the interac-
tions between international diversification and
both transactional and relational ownership are
both positive and significant, the interaction with
transactional ownership is significantly more pos-
itive (2  15.18, p  .01). Supporting Hypothesis
2, this suggests that transactional owners are more
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statisticsa
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1. Growth 0.01 0.11
2. Profit 0.93 0.52 .18
3. Employment growth 0.03 0.08 .25 .18
4. Salaries 3E5 1E6 .02 .01 .00
5. Industry growth 0.01 0.05 .50 .07 .02 .01
6. Industry profit 0.8 0.2 .10 .41 .13 .06 .16
7. Industry volatility 0.01 0.00 .03 .16 .04 .12 .04 .34
8. Size 11.64 1.28 .01 .09 .02 .57 .00 .06 .22
9. Free cash flow 0.00 0.03 .00 .22 .22 .05 .04 .16 .12 .06
10. Leverage 0.32 0.23 .15 .36 .25 .13 .07 .24 .20 .11 .27
11. Cash 0.11 0.09 .04 .21 .15 .00 .03 .15 .11 .09 .11 .32
12. Fixed assets 0.25 0.13 .02 .01 .05 .16 .04 .11 .06 .14 .00 .10 .28
13. Volatility 0.02 0.01 .02 .16 .08 .12 .02 .13 .42 .25 .15 .09 .11 .02
14. Transactional
ownership
0.07 0.07 .11 .38 .09 .15 .06 .01 .08 .36 .24 .37 .14 .12 .03
15. Relational ownership 0.64 0.12 .02 .04 .09 .07 .01 .16 .07 .24 .06 .00 .08 .11 .13 .16
16. International
diversification
0.07 0.08 .02 .10 .02 .82 .00 .02 .02 .62 .04 .08 .05 .21 .11 .29 .06
17. Product diversification 1.03 0.40 .03 .11 .06 .42 .04 .02 .01 .53 .06 .10 .14 .14 .14 .22 .08 .64
a Correlations with an absolute value greater than .01 are significant at the .05 level.
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concerned with diversifying for the sake of im-
proved profit than are relational owners.
Model 5 tests the effects of international diversi-
fication and ownership structure on employment
growth. As with sales growth, both relational own-
ership and transactional ownership are positively
related to employment growth (although the two
coefficients are not significantly different), and in-
ternational diversification has no significant main
effect. Addition of the hypothesized interactions in
model 6 significantly improves model fit. Although
the interaction between international diversifica-
tion and transactional ownership is not significant,
the interaction between international diversifica-
tion and relational ownership is positive and sig-
nificant. In keeping with Hypothesis 3, the differ-
ence between the two interactions is significant
(F  6.97, p  .01), suggesting that relational own-
ers, unlike transactional owners, pressure manag-
ers to increase employment in response to a move
abroad. Overall, we infer from these results that
transactional owners use international diversifica-
tion to enhance profits, and relational owners use
diversification to both improve competitiveness
and to enhance sales revenues, thus not only pre-
serving domestic employment but perhaps even
expanding the workforces of firms.
Models 7 and 8 test the effects of international
diversification and ownership structure on mana-
gerial compensation. In the base model, model 7,
diversification has a marginally significant, posi-
tive effect on director salaries. Relational owner-
ship has a significant, positive effect, and transac-
tional ownership has no significant effect. Addition
of the hypothesized interactions in model 8 signif-
icantly improves model fit. Although both interac-
tions are significant, the interaction between inter-
national diversification and relational ownership is
significantly more positive than the interaction be-
tween international diversification and transac-
tional ownership (F  68.39, p  .01), thus sup-
porting Hypothesis 4.
Table 3 presents models comparable to those in
Table 2, but using the smaller sample for which we
had data on product diversification. As this sample
is more restricted, we present this analysis primar-
ily as a robustness check to illustrate that similar
results are obtained when product diversification is
substituted for international diversification. Even
though we expected similar results, it is important
TABLE 2
Relational Owners, Transactional Owners, and International Diversification: Regression Analysis Resultsa
Variables
Sales Growth Profit Employment Growth Salaries
Model 1:
Fixed
Effects
Model 2:
Fixed
Effects
Model 3:
2SLS-IV
Model 4:
2SLS-IV
Model 5:
Fixed
Effects
Model 6:
Fixed
Effects
Model 7:
Fixed
Effects
Model 8:
Fixed
Effects
Industrial growth 1.00** 1.00** 0.14† 0.16† 0.12** 0.12** 0.54† 0.53*
Industrial profit 0.01 0.01 0.89** 0.88** 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.03
Industrial volatility 0.21 0.25 2.59* 2.92* 0.68† 0.67† 5.95† 6.09†
Size 0.11** 0.11** 0.09** 0.08** 0.01* 0.01* 1.01** 0.99**
Free cash flow 0.21** 0.20** 2.15** 2.11** 0.56** 0.56** 0.29 0.45
Leverage 0.07** 0.07** 0.21** 0.16** 0.07** 0.07** 0.57** 0.55**
Cash 0.00 0.01 0.31** 0.35** 0.02 0.02 0.58** 0.55**
Fixed assets 0.01 0.01 0.06** 0.06** 0.15 0.22
Volatility 0.17† 0.17† 2.46** 2.42** 0.39** 0.38** 5.73** 5.47**
Diversification 0.03 0.02 3.91** 3.09** 0.10 0.08 1.34* 1.49*
Transactional ownership 0.11** 0.12** 1.23** 1.04** 0.05* 0.06* 0.13 0.46
Relational ownership 0.08** 0.09** 0.36** 0.48** 0.03* 0.04* 0.40** 0.80**
Diversification  transactional
ownership
0.31 20.21** 0.02 8.01**
Diversification  relational
ownership
0.83** 8.71* 0.56* 25.34**
n 14,294 14,294 14,026 14,026 10,628 10,628 10,756 10,756
F 211.6** 196.9** 65.64** 60.81** 65.62** 67.0**
R2 .29 .29 .14 .14 .14 .15
F: Improvement in R2 11.0** 5.5** 80.5**
Wald 2 172,168** 169,390**
a All models also included year fixed effects (not reported).
† p  .10
* p  .05
** p  .01
Two-tailed tests.
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to note that, unlike the case of international diver-
sification, the main effect for product diversifica-
tion on profit is negative and marginally significant
(see model 3). In terms of support for our hypoth-
eses, the only substantive difference found with
product diversification pertains to model 8. Al-
though the coefficient for the interaction between
diversification and relational ownership is larger
than the coefficient for the interaction with trans-
actional ownership, the difference between the two
is only marginally significant (F  2.87, p  .1).
Thus, overall, Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 receive strong
support with both product and international diver-
sification, and Hypothesis 4 receives strong sup-
port with international diversification, but only
marginal support with product diversification.
Finally, to illustrate the economic significance of
our results, we used model 4 of Table 2 to plot the
relationship between international diversification
and predicted profit for various ownership struc-
tures. As Figure 1 illustrates, international diversi-
fication generally leads to improved profit. Further,
relational ownership strengthens this relationship,
but transactional ownership strengthens it to a
much greater extent. As an example, the slope for
the relationship between international diversifica-
tion and profit is 69 percent greater for firms with
high levels of relational ownership (i.e., the 95th
percentile of that variable) than it is for the median
firm. However, the slope for the relationship be-
tween international diversification and profit is al-
most three times steeper for firms with high levels
of transactional ownership (i.e., the 95th percentile
of that variable) than it is for the median firm.
DISCUSSION
We investigated how differences between trans-
actional owners and relational owners shaped the
performance consequences of diversification both
for shareholders and for stakeholders. Going con-
trary to prior work in which it is assumed that all
powerful owners appropriate rents solely through
profit, we propose that some owners also appropri-
ate rents through growth, and they may influence
managers accordingly. Performance goals are
shaped by the type of relationship they have with
the firms they invest in: transactional owners have
arms’-length ties and therefore appropriate rents
strictly through higher profits, but relational own-
TABLE 3
Relational Owners, Transactional Owners, and Product Diversification: Fixed-Effects Regression Analysis Resultsa
Variables
Sales Growth Profit Employment Growth Salaries
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Industrial growth 0.97** 0.97** 0.20† 0.21* 0.10** 0.10** 0.52† 0.56†
Industrial profit 0.03* 0.03* 1.07** 1.07** 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.02
Industrial volatility 0.65 0.62 5.23** 5.26** 0.81* 0.80* 5.20 5.19
Size 0.19** 0.19** 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01† 1.14** 1.14**
Free cash flow 0.29** 0.29** 1.82** 1.83** 0.53** 0.53** 0.01 0.07
Leverage 0.07** 0.07** 0.21** 0.20** 0.07** 0.07** 0.56** 0.53**
Cash 0.04 0.04† 0.28** 0.30** 0.01 0.01 0.79** 0.78**
Fixed assets 0.08** 0.09** 0.05 0.03 0.09** 0.09** 0.05 0.09
Volatility 0.04 0.05 2.49** 2.54** 0.37** 0.37** 6.93** 6.72**
Diversification 0.01 0.00 0.06† 0.05† 0.01 0.01 0.27** 0.3**
Transactional ownership 0.19** 0.21** 1.64** 1.58** 0.05† 0.066† 0.18 0.24
Relational ownership 0.11** 0.11** 0.39** 0.37** 0.02 0.032 0.59** 0.71**
Diversification  transactional
ownership
0.19** 0.98** 0.12* 1.66**
Diversification  relational
ownership
0.14** 0.02 0.12** 2.68**
n 8,432 8,432 8,331 8,331 8,007 8,007 7,438 7,438
F 176.0** 162.9** 153.7** 142.4** 48.37** 45.44** 50.21** 48.7**
R2 .34 .34 .31 .32 .13 .13 .14 .15
F: Improvement in R2 14.1** 14.6** 12.9** 31.5**
a All models also included year fixed effects (not reported).
† p  .10
* p  .05
** p  .01
Two-tailed tests.
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ers have closer ties that allow for the appropriation
of rents through higher growth, which enhances
both business prospects and mutual safeguards.
Their divergent performance goals affect their orien-
tation toward other stakeholders as well: relational
owners facilitate greater value capture by stakehold-
ers from diversification than do transactional owners.
Our empirical analysis yields results supportive
of these ideas. The relationship between diversifi-
cation and profit is more positive under transac-
tional ownership than under relational ownership.
Conversely, the relationship between diversifica-
tion and growth is more positive with relational
ownership than with transactional ownership. Fur-
thermore, diversification yields greater benefits for
stakeholders—that is, higher employment growth
and executive salaries—under relational owner-
ship than under transactional ownership.
The relationship between strategic action and
performance is a central question in the strategy
field (Barney, 2002), yet the question of “perfor-
mance for whom” has not been given sufficient
emphasis, particularly in the diversification litera-
ture. We explain the importance of considering dif-
ferences in the performance goals of owners from a
rent appropriation perspective. Differences in per-
formance goals arise because various shareholders
and stakeholders capture value in different ways.
Although the prior research assumption has been
that all shareholders seek profit from corporate di-
versification strategies, our research suggests that
profit maximization is not a universal goal of own-
ers. As we found in our study, profit is the only goal
for transactional owners, but growth is a more im-
portant goal for relational owners. Similarly, re-
search in the future might delve more deeply into
issues related to the performance outcomes for
shareholders. It would be worth exploring the ex-
tent to which the enhanced growth from diversifi-
cation actually improves business prospects or
FIGURE 1
Economic Significancea
a The x-axis plots international diversification from the 5th to the 95th percentile, and the y-axis gives
predicted performance. The line labeled “Median” represents firms that have the median level of both
relational and transactional ownership. The line labeled “High relational” depicts firms that have the median
level of transactional ownership, but a high level (i.e., 95th percentile) of relational ownership. Similarly, the
line labeled “High transactional” depicts firms that have the median level of relational ownership, but a high
level (i.e., 95th percentile) of transactional ownership.
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safeguards for relational owners. Furthermore, we
expected the performance outcomes to reflect sub-
stantive responsiveness to powerful owners, but
the possibility of accounting manipulations by
managers for symbolic conformance (Westphal &
Zajac, 1994) requires more investigation.
It would also be helpful to extend our typology of
relational versus transactional to explicitly em-
brace owner types that may be prevalent in other
institutional contexts. For example, research on
U.S. firms has distinguished between pressure-re-
sistant owners (who are similar to transactional
owners in that they lack business relationships
with the firms in which they hold stock) and pres-
sure-sensitive institutional investors (similar to re-
lational owners in that they have business relation-
ships with the owned firms) (David et al., 1998).
Similarly, family owners appear to have a long-
term attachment similar to that of relational owners
(Schulze, Lubatkin, & Dino, 2003). Such owners are
prominent all over the world, including in Europe
(Faccio & Lang, 2002), Asia (Claessens, Djankov,
Fan, & Lang, 2002), and China (Delios, Wu & Zhou,
2006). Although caution must be exercised in ex-
trapolating our results, which may be specific to
the Japanese context, we believe it would be worth-
while to investigate whether the performance goals
of these other types of owners could be distin-
guished in ways similar to what we have done for
transactional owners and relational owners in
Japan.
The question of “performance for whom” is even
more salient for stakeholders other than sharehold-
ers. Just as shareholders can differ in their perfor-
mance goals, various stakeholders also capture
value in a variety of ways. Employees and execu-
tives capture value both from higher compensation
and from reduced employment risk. Modeling the
performance outcomes desired by other stakehold-
ers, such as customers, suppliers, and the commu-
nity at large, is analytically and empirically chal-
lenging, but the effort holds considerable promise
(Lieberman & Chacar, 1997). From a rent appropri-
ation perspective, a strategy provides competitive
advantage and yields economic rents when the ben-
efits to at least some stakeholders are greater than
their opportunity costs (Coff, 1999). Thus, finding a
way to aggregate performance benefits for various
stakeholders should provide a better understanding
of the extent to which diversification strategies cre-
ate economic rents in forms that cannot be identi-
fied from shareholder profit. Furthermore, the ex-
tents to which various stakeholders capture value
from a diversification strategy will likely differ.
Future research can seek to explain how value gets
allocated among various stakeholder groups.
Our research provides insights as to why employ-
ees and managers obtain greater benefits from di-
versification under relational ownership than un-
der transactional ownership. Our explanation is
based on a rent appropriation perspective. We ar-
gue that the pursuit of growth to appropriate rent
from their relationships causes relational owners to
be more tolerant of rent appropriation by stake-
holders. Alternately, it can be argued that relational
owners’ embedded relationships make them sup-
portive of taken-for-granted institutional policies of
lifetime employment. Institutional legitimacy ex-
planations complement our explanation of rela-
tional owners’ support of lifetime employees but
fail to explain relational owners’ support of higher
executive pay. Unlike lifetime employment, which
is institutionally legitimized in Japan, high mana-
gerial compensation runs counter to Japanese
norms of egalitarianism (Dore, 2000). Although
managers and executives in Japanese firms have a
strong respect for seniority and reward it with
greater pay, the differences among levels of senior-
ity are kept low. The ratio of the wages earned by
the highest- versus the lowest-paid employee is
typically about 400:1 in U.S. companies, but it is
just 10:1 in Japanese companies (Wahlgren, 2001).
Thus, the institutional norm in Japan is to curtail
high executive compensation. If relational owners
support stakeholders in accordancewith institutional
norms, one would expect them to limit the extent to
which managers can use diversification to justify
higher salaries. Instead, we found that relational own-
ers foster higher managerial salaries from diversifica-
tion, suggesting a rent appropriation rather than in-
stitutional legitimacy explanation.
Disentangling rent appropriation from institu-
tional legitimacy is a complex task, but one worth
pursuing. Stakeholders likely benefit most when
institutional and rent appropriation explanations
converge. Thus, relational owners may support em-
ployee stakeholders on the basis of norms of insti-
tutional legitimacy, and such support is reinforced
by rent appropriation considerations from which
relational owners benefit as well. Finding contexts
in which rent appropriation explanations conflict
with institutional legitimacy—and therefore weaken
the effects of rent appropriation considerations—
holds considerable promise for advancing this line
of work.
Our findings also have important implications
for the governance literature, which is rooted in an
economic perspective on stakeholders in which
they are generally fixed claimants with no need for
governance safeguards. Only shareholders, as re-
sidual claimants, are deserving of governance safe-
guards according to this perspective (Shleifer &
2010 649David, O’Brien, Yoshikawa, and Delios
Vishny, 1997). Although the importance of stake-
holders has long been recognized in the manage-
ment literature, most notably in the extensive re-
search on the stakeholder theory of the firm
spearheaded by Freeman (1984), several main-
stream economists (Allen & Gale, 2000; Tirole,
2001; Zingales, 2000) and strategy scholars with an
economics perspective (Mahoney, 2007; Wang &
Barney, 2006) are now proposing that stakeholders
require explicit consideration, especially in the
context of economies reliant on “knowledge work-
ers.” Our study contributes to this conversation by
suggesting that ownership structure can serve as a
governance mechanism for safeguarding stakehold-
ers as well as shareholders. Broadening the some-
what narrow preoccupation with shareholders in
prior work to include governance safeguards for a
broader set of stakeholders holds considerable
promise for future research.
Our research also has implications for the com-
parative governance literature, which addresses
worldwide differences and similarities in gover-
nance (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003; Ahmadjian & Rob-
bins, 2005; Hall & Soskice, 2001). Much of the early
work in this literature emphasized unique gover-
nance practices of various national economies; con-
ceptual work distinguishing shareholder capital-
ism (e.g., the U.S. and U.K. governance regimes)
from stakeholder capitalism (e.g., the Japanese and
German governance regimes) (Allen & Gale, 2000;
Dore, 2000) is an example. Several studies have
addressed differences between U.S. and Japanese
corporations. For example, (1) unlike U.S. firms
that emphasize profit over growth, Japanese firms
emphasize growth over profit (Abegglen & Stalk,
1985; Aoki, 1988; Kester, 1991), (2) Japanese firms
invest more in R&D than do U.S. firms (Hundley,
Jacobson, & Park, 1996; Thomas & Waring, 1999),
and (3) shareholder-owner relationships in Japa-
nese firms reflect stewardship norms, but those in
the United States reflect principal-agent norms (Lee
& O’Neill, 2003). More recent comparative gover-
nance research explores the extent to which con-
vergence is taking place across countries (Gordon &
Roe, 2004).
Our results provide evidence both for divergence
and convergence, with the degree of openness of
capital markets acting as an incomplete impetus to
convergence. As long as Japanese capital markets
stayed relatively insulated from the rest of the
world, relational owners helped preserve firms’
commitment to stakeholders by emphasizing
growth over profit, reflecting their divergence from
more shareholder-oriented U.S. firms. However, as
Japanese capital markets have opened up to foreign
owners, Japanese firms have faced pressures to em-
phasize profit over growth and hence have con-
verged somewhat with U.S. firms in terms of per-
formance objectives. For example, Japanese firms
have greatly increased their access to international
bond markets for debt financing (David, O’Brien, &
Yoshikawa, 2008).
Nevertheless, despite some evidence of conver-
gence, we also find resistance in the form of the
traditional governance provided by relational own-
ers, who continue to support diversification strate-
gies that emphasize growth rather than profit. The
Economist (2007) reported a shift toward a share-
holder orientation in the late 2000s, as Japanese
firms increasingly adopted many of the practices of
U.S. corporations, such as stock options, indepen-
dent directors, and even hostile takeovers. Yet the
article reiterated that debates continue as to the
appropriate balance between stakeholder and
shareholder orientations. It is perhaps likely that
corporate governance “hybrids” incorporating el-
ements of the U.S. or U.K. model into local prac-
tices will increasingly be seen as radical institu-
tional change progresses (Aguilera & Jackson,
2003; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). It will be
interesting to see how and how much governance
orientations change over time in Japan and in
other countries.
As foreign owners spread their investments
across global boundaries (Useem, 1998), our re-
search gains implications for other stakeholder-
oriented nations, such as Germany and France,
that are grappling with the conflict between a
traditional stakeholder orientation and pressures
for a shareholder orientation. Furthermore, for-
eign owners include owners from various coun-
tries. In this study we found support for the view
that foreign portfolio investors seek rent appro-
priation through profit. Differences in national
origin may, however, have other implications
that warrant further research.
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